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I. INTRODUCTION
Increasing competition from foreign corporations and a general
downturn in economic conditions has caused many United States com-
panies to look for innovative methods of establishing a competitive
presence in international markets.1 One approach has been to reassess
the American system of labor-management relations. Recently, several
large domestic companies have implemented systems under which man-
agement and labor engage in cooperative decisionmaking directed to-
ward increased employee satisfaction, productivity, and profitability.2
These cooperative efforts, however, may violate the National Labor Re-
lations Act (the NLRA), which purports to establish an adversarial sys-
tem for United States labor relations.3
The NLRA is the touchstone for United States labor relations.4 Es-
sentially, the NLRA gives unions a statutory right to participate ac-
tively in managerial decisionmaking; thus, the statute imposes a duty
on employers to bargain in good faith with the employees' exclusive
bargaining representative over "rates of pay, wages, hours of employ-
ment, or other conditions of employment."' 5 Section 8(d), however, spe-
cifically states that the duty to bargain in good faith "does not compel
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a conces-
sion."' As a result, the United States system of labor relations, often
characterized as an adversarial relationship between management and
labor, traditionally has rejected cooperative efforts between labor and
1. Comment, Japanese Labor Relations and Legal Implications of Their Possible Use in the
United States, 5 Nw. J. OF INT'L L. & Bus. 585 (1983).
2. Id. at 606-07; see also Merrifield, Worker Participation in Decisions Within Undertak-
ings, 5 CoMP. LAB. L. 1, 3 (1982).
3. See Comment, supra note 1, at 586.
4. See also supra Special Project Note, Mandatory and Permissive Subjects, at notes 34-35
and accompanying text. See generally supra Special Project Note, Future Cooperative Efforts.
5. Aaron, Labor Relations Law in the United States from a Comparative Perspective, 39
WASH. & LxE L. REv. 1247, 1262 (1982) (quoting National Labor Relations Act § 9(a), 29 U.S.C.
§ 159(a) (1976) [hereinafter NLRA]). Aaron states, "Decisions of the NLRB, enforced by the
courts, have expanded this duty [of good faith] to embrace virtually every managerial decision that
affects the employment relation." Id.; see supra Special Project Note, Mandatory and Permissive
Subjects, at notes 30-31.
6. See Aaron, supra note 5, at 1262 (quoting NLRA § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1976)).
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management.7 Unions generally have been critical of management, with
union influence being exerted almost solely through negotiation and
grievance procedures.8
Until recently, American courts, legislatures, employers, and unions
have viewed our labor relations system as the "only reality." Conse-
quently, little interest has been shown toward the labor laws and prac-
tices of other countries.9 With an increasing focus on foreign labor-
management relations as a way to increase productivity in American
corporations, many labor law specialists have examined the various la-
bor-management systems that exist in other industrialized countries.10
As the United States contemplates embarking on a restructuring of its
labor-management relations in order to compete effectively in world
markets, a thorough assessment of these other systems is required to
uncover the options available.
This Special Project Note analyzes the labor relations systems of
the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan, and Sweden, focusing on the
statutory developments as well as the social, political, and economic
factors that shape those systems. Parts II through IV discuss the gen-
eral structure and operation of each of these systems. Part V compares
and contrasts these systems to the American system by applying them
to a hypothetical corporate merger. Finally, Part VI discusses the feasi-
bility of a partial or total adoption of any of the three foreign systems
by the United States.
II. FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
The fundamental structure of labor relations in the Federal Repub-
lic of Germany can be summed up in one word: co-determination." Es-
sentially a European phenomenon, co-determination began in Germany
and, during the post-World War II period, spread in various forms to
several other European nations. 2 In its purest form, co-determination
is employee representation on corporate boards."3 Understanding the
7. Summers, Worker Participation in Sweden and the United States: Some Comparisons
from an American Perspective, 133 U. PA. L. REv. 175, 202 (1984); see supra Special Project Note,
Future Cooperative Efforts, at notes 9-10.
8. See Aaron, supra note 5, at 1262-63 (citing Professor Adolph F. Sturmthal).
9. Id. at 1248.
10. Id. "It has come as a shock to many of our labor law specialists ... to learn that some
features of our system, far from exemplifying the international norm, are regarded by foreign ob-
servers as anomalous, if not downright peculiar." Id.
11. Isaacson, Codetermination Revisited, 6 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 533, 533 (1981). In German,
Mitbestimmung means co-determination. Lutter, The German System of Worker Participation in
Practice, J. Bus. L. 154 (1982).
12. See Isaacson, supra note 11, at 533.
13. Id. One commentator has noted:
The conventional idea of co-determination in the Federal Republic of Germany is restricted
1988] 629
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full meaning and implications of co-determination requires an analysis
of its historical evolution.
A. Statutory Development of Co-Determination
1. Development Prior to World War II
The earliest legislative efforts at co-determination occurred in 1848,
when the first elected German Parliament met to adopt a constitution.
14
Parliament intended to integrate a political constitution with legislation
regulating trade and industry.15 On January 12, 1849, a bill' was intro-
duced creating "factory regulations," which sought to establish commit-
tees to represent factory workers.'7 This proposal was not mandatory,
however, and therefore was not binding on German industry.' 8
The first effective effort toward co-determination came with the
enactment of the Arbeiterschutzgesetz on June 1, 1891.19 Under this
legislation, German owners retained the right to issue unilaterally work-
shop rules and regulations. If a permanent factory workers' committee
existed, however, the committee was entitled to a hearing on the im-
pending implementation of the workshop regulations.2 0
In 1900 Article 91 of the revised Bayrisches Berggesetz became the
first legislation to make worker committees compulsory.2" This law re-
quired the creation of worker committees in all mines employing more
than twenty workers.2 2 In 1916 the requirement of compulsory commit-
tees was expanded to all war effort enterprises with more than fifty blue
to the institutional participation of employees in the leadership and organization of an under-
taking. But, as an element of the labour constitution, co-determination also implies participa-
tion of employees in matters extending beyond the social and economic organization of the
undertaking.
Richardi, Worker Participation in Decisions Within Undertakings in the Federal Republic of
Germany, 5 Comp. LAB. L. 23, 31 (1982).
14. See Kolvenbach, Co-determination in Germany: History and Practical Experience, 9
INT'L Bus. LAW. 163, 163 (1981). General co-determination efforts had begun over a decade earlier
with the promulgation of proposals for the representation of factory workers, which limited man-
agement's power. Id. As early as 1835, Robert Mohl, a constitutional law theologian, sought to
form worker committees to control employee profit-sharing. Richardi, supra note 13, at 23.
15. See Kolvenbach, supra note 14, at 163.
16. The bill was entitled Gewerbeordnung fur das Deutsche Reich. Id.
17. Id. More specifically, the committees were to "maintain the order in the factory, solve
grievances, increase the interest of the workers in the work of the factory and to observe at the
same time the rights of the employees." Id.
18. Id. Some factory owners did implement the committees on a voluntary basis. Id.
19. See Richardi, supra note 13, at 25; see also Kolvenbach, supra note 14, at 163-64.
20. See Richardi, supra note 13, at 25.
21. See Kolvenbach, supra note 14, at 163.
22. Id. In 1905 a Prussian law changed the numerical requirement to more than 100 workers.
[Vol. 41:627
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or white collar employees.2 3 The purpose of the committees was to pro-
mote a good relationship between management and employees, as well
as among the employees themselves.
24
A 1919 amendment to the German constitution provided for em-
ployee representation on works councils, regional works councils, and a
Reich's Works Council.2 5 This provision sought to promote and protect
the social and economic interests of employees. 6 More importantly, in
1920 the German government enacted the first extensive co-determina-
tion legislation. The Works Councils Act (or Betriebstategesetz) re-
quired that one or two workers' representatives be elected to the
supervisory boards of corporations and to share rights equal to manage-
ment. In addition, this legislation provided for the election of works
councils in all of German industry.2 Consequently, by the early 1920s,
the concept of co-determination had become relatively entrenched in
German industrial relations. In 1933, however, these worker representa-
tive arrangements in both the factory and the enterprise were abolished
and replaced by the "Leader Principle. ' 29
2. Development After World War II
While a variety of labor legislation followed World War 11,30 three
primary enactments establish the foundation of co-determination in
Germany. The Works Constitution Act of 1972 provides for the election
of works councils in all businesses with five or more permanent, quali-
fied 1 employees. 3 2 Two other statutes, the Enterprise Organization Act
of 195288 and the Co-determination Act of 1976, provide employees in
most enterprises with a statutory right to worker representation on su-
23. Id. at 164.
24. Id. In 1918 the numerical requirement was reduced from 50 to 20 workers. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. See Lutter, supra note 11, at 154.
28. See Kolvenbach, supra note 14, at 164.
29. Id. The law of January 20, 1934 replaced national labor works councils with confidential
associations composed of members selected by the employer, subject to the approval of the Na-
tional Socialist Party. These confidential associations did not have any co-determination rights,
but rather served a consultative function. See Richardi, supra note 13, at 29. A similar law cover-
ing civil servants was enacted on March 23, 1934. Id.
30. See generally Kolvenbach, supra note 14, at 164.
31. Permanent employees must be at least 18 years old. Zakson, Worker Participation:
Industrial Democracy and Managerial Prerogative in the Federal Republic of Germany, Sweden
and the United States, 8 HASTINGS INT'L & CoMP. L. REV. 93, 115 (1984).
32. See Wiedemann, Codetermination by Workers in German Enterprises, 28 AM. J. Comp.
L. 79, 81 (1980).
33. The Enterprise Organization Act was amended in 1972. See Zakson, supra note 31, at
19881
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pervisory boards. 4 Thus, by 1976, Germany had a detailed statutory
system establishing a network of participation at the shop floor and
management levels.3 5
B. Mechanisms of Worker Participation
Three primary mechanisms of worker participation exist in Ger-
many: (1) collective agreements negotiated by trade unions, (2) work-
shop co-determination by way of works councils, and (3) supervisory
board co-determination. 6 Each method fulfills a specialized function
within the integrated German system of co-determination.
1. Collective Bargaining Agreements
Collective bargaining in Germany can be characterized as industry-
wide bargaining 37 in which employers' associations and centralized
workers' unions conduct negotiations.3 8 The German constitution au-
thorizes trade unions to engage in collective bargaining and enter into
collective bargaining agreements. The centralized bargaining structure
of trade unions, however, grew independently from constitutional au-
thorization as a response to the centralization of employer associa-
tions. 0 Because the average worker is not involved in negotiations, this
centralized scheme of collective bargaining has resulted in a low level of
labor-management confrontation.41
Traditionally, the scope of collective agreements has been limited
to such topics as wages, hours, and other closely related issues.'2 In
part, this limited scope may be the result of the centralized nature of
collective bargaining and the difficulty of establishing unified conditions
34. Id. at 117; see also infra notes 46-90 and accompanying text.
35. See Kolvenbach, supra note 14, at 164.
36. See Zakson, supra note 31, at 114. See generally W. KOLVENBACH, COOPERATION BETWEEN
MANAGEMENT AND LABOR 11 (1982).
37. See Bairstow, The Structure of Bargaining: International Comparisons-A Story of Di-
versity, 31 LAB. L.J. 514, 518 (1980). The "industry wide" characterization exists because bargain-
ing structures vary from industry to industry. Id.
38. See Zakson, supra note 31, at 114. Of 17 national unions, the I G Metall is the largest
with over 2.5 million members. See Bairstow, supra note 37, at 518. Forty-three employer associa-
tions exist, with the largest representing metal industry employers. Id.
39. See Richardi, supra note 13, at 44-45.
40. See Bairstow, supra note 37, at 519. As one commentator noted:
Within the German context, there is a diversification of bargaining arrangements for particu-
lar industries, but there is policy co-ordination at the very top, and these efforts are all volun-
tary-not government directed. Since the degree of diversity is much higher among the
unions than in the tightly knit, powerful structure which characterizes the employer group,
labor finds the unified management group a formidable adversary.
Id.
41. See Zakson, supra note 31, at 114 n.130.
42. Id. at 114.
632 [Vol. 41:627
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of employment across the industry. In addition, particularized issues
are negotiated more effectively at the enterprise level through the works
council.43 Under German legislation, however, trade unions possess the
"initiative priority" over works councils in labor management rela-
tions.44 Although the effectiveness of centralized collective bargaining as
a mechanism for co-determination in Germany remains unproven, at
the very least, these centralized collective agreements negotiated
through industry-wide bargaining extend the sphere of union influence
and co-determination beyond the confines of the enterprise. 5
2. Works Councils
The Works Constitution Act of 197246 established the second
mechanism for co-determination in Germany, the works council.
Whereas unions negotiate collective bargaining agreements for the en-
tire industry, the works council constitutes the only organized body for
negotiations between management and workers of the individual enter-
prise.47 The act4" provides for the creation of works councils in every
business having five or more permanent employees. 9 If the enterprise
43. Id. at 114-15.
44. See Richardi, supra note 13, at 45. According to Professor Richardi, under § 87 of the
BetrVG, "the works council may only co-determine in the matters it specifies if a regulation of
labour contract does not exist." Id. Additionally, Richardi states that § 77 Abs. 3 of the BetrVG
provides that "regulations for each shop agreement are blocked if remunerations and other work-
ing conditions are regulated by labour contract or usually are to be so regulated." Id.
45. See Wiedemann, supra note 32, at 83.
The power and influence that unions wield through collective bargaining agreements and
through their participation in Labor Courts and in the administration of social programs is
known as codetermination above the enterprise level: These participatory rights are to be
distinguished from true codetermination in that here the unions appear in their role as volun-
tary organizations which represent only their members rather than all employees. The repre-
sentation of all employees in works councils or on supervisory boards is required by law, while
membership in a union is voluntary and, on the average, only a third of all workers in the
Federal Republic belong. In spite of these theoretical differences, codetermination above the
enterprise level has an effect similar to that of codetermination at the enterprise and plant
level; it serves to extend union influence in the economy.
Id. (footnote omitted).
46. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
47. See Lutter, supra note 11, at 160. See generally W. KOLVENBACH, supra note 36, at 25-33.
48. In German, the Works Constitution Act is called the Betriebsverfassungsgesetz. See Ri-
chardi, supra note 13, at 34.
49. Id. Typically, the requirements for eligibility on the works council include the following:
(1) only employees; (2) at least 18 years old; and (3) at least 6 months of employment. See Wiede-
mann, supra note 32, at 81. Union membership is neither encouraged nor discouraged. See Ri-
chardi, supra note 13, at 42-43. Within the enterprise, however, trade unions act as political
parties ensuring union representation on works councils. Id. at 43. Since 1972 more than 75% of all
works council seats have been filled by union members, and virtually all "chairmen" of works
councils have been union affiliates. Id. Works councils represent all employees, regardless of union
activities. Id. at 43-44.
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employs fewer than twenty-one employees, the council may be com-
posed of only one member.50 Only employees elect representatives to
the works council. 1 When the enterprise performs several "works," an
overriding works council may be established to represent employees in
matters involving the whole enterprise.2
The Works Constitution Act covers most subjects open to negotia-
tions between management and the works council, including hiring, fir-
ing, mergers, and other structural changes in the enterprise, social
matters, the work place, and operational, personnel, and vocational
training.5s An employer must obtain the consent of the works council
before implementing a change in any of these matters."' If the works
council withholds consent,5 5 the employer may seek the consent of the
labor court 56 or the mediation services of a conciliation board.57 In ei-
ther event, in the interim the employer is prohibited from implement-
ing the disputed action, unless "urgently required.
'58
In Germany, worker participation in the most sensitive areas of
management occurs through employee representation on works coun-
cils, not through union representation .5  The right to be consulted
before decisionmaking combined with the right to share in the decisions
invests the works councils with great power and influence.60 Although
worker participation began as a right to consultation and representa-
tion, management today seeks the assistance and involvement of shop-
floor and company works councils in virtually all areas of labor and so-
cial welfare, at both the planning and implementation stages.6 1 Conse-
50. See Zakson, supra note 31, at 115.
51. See Wiedemann, supra note 32, at 81. At last estimate, only 8-10% of all qualified works
had a works council. While many small businesses do not have works councils, virtually all enter-
prises with greater than 50 employees have a works council. See Richardi, supra note 13, at 34-35;
see also Wiedemann, supra note 32, at 81.
52. See Richardi, supra note 13, at 35. The overriding works council is called a Gesamtbe-
triebsrat. Id.
53. See Zakson, supra note 31, at 115.
54. Id.
55. Id. The Act specifies situations in which consent may be denied, such as when the pro-
posed change goes against an imposed ruling by the conciliation board. Id. at 115 n.135.
56. Id. at 115.
57. The Act provides for mediation by a conciliation board if management and the works
council fail to reach an agreement. Id. at 116. The conciliation board consists of labor and manage-
ment representatives plus a "neutral chair." Id. One of the most important changes in the Act is
the expanded scope of authority of the conciliation board. While its primary purpose is mediation,
the board may decide certain issues if agreement cannot be reached by the parties. Id. at 116-17.
58. Id. at 115; see also Lutter, supra note 11, at 157.
59. See Zakson, supra note 31, at 123-24. German employers appear to be more willing to
share decisioninaking with employee representatives than with union officials. Id. at 124.
60. See Lutter, supra note 11, at 158. The works council, especially the chairman, has a very
influential and respected position in the enterprise. Id.
61. Id. at 157.
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quently, the works council has played a key role in maintaining stability
in labor-management relations within the enterprise by establishing a
unified voice for the interests of labor.2
3. Supervisory Board Representation
Representation on supervisory boards,63 the third mechanism for
co-determination in Germany, began with the Enterprise Organization
Act of 19524 and the Co-determination Act of 1976.5 The Enterprise
Organization Act applies to companies employing between 500 and 2000
workers." The Co-determination Act applies to most companies 67 em-
ploying more than 2000 employees.e
Under the Enterprise Organization Act, employees of the enter-
prise may elect one-third of the supervisory board members.6 9 If the
supervisory board contains only one or two labor seats, then employees
of the enterprise must fill them. 0 If more than two labor seats are on
the board, then union representatives from outside the enterprise are
eligible for election. 1 In theory, the Enterprise Organization Act sought
to provide co-determination in managerial decisionmaking by giving
62. Id. at 160. The works council constitutes "the only legitimate representative of worker
interests on the shop floor and in the company as a whole." Id. at 159. In effect, the works council
provides middle management with a voice in labor-management relations that it does not have
under the United States system of labor relations. See supra Special Project Note, Hybrid Em-
ployees, at note 47 and accompanying text. See generally Isaacson, supra note 1.
63. Worker represented supervisory boards are called Aufsichtsrat. See Kolvenbach, supra
note 14, at 164. See generally W. KOLVENBACH, supra note 36, at 35-72.
64. See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
65. See supra note 34 and accompanying text. A third statute, the Coal and Steel Act of
1951, also provided for worker representation on supervisory boards within the coal and steel in-
dustries. See Kolvenbach, supra note 14, at 164.
66. See Wiedemann, supra note 32, at 80; see also Zakson, supra note 31, at 118.
67. Exemptions are made for mutual insurance companies, partnerships, media, churches,
and educational or charitable institutions. See Wiedemann, supra note 32, at 79.
68. Id.
If the enterprise is organized as a joint-stock company, or if it has more than 500 employees
and is organized as a Gewerksschaft, a profit-oriented cooperative, a limited liability company
or a certain kind of partnership, it is covered by one of these two Acts. If it falls within one of
these groups and employs more than 2000 workers, it is covered by the Co-determination Act
of 1976. If its form and structure fits within one of these groups but it employs 2000 workers
or less, it is covered by the Enterprise Organization Act.
See Zakson supra note 31, at 118 (citations omitted).
69. See Zakson, supra note 31, at 118-19. The shareholders elect the other two-thirds of the
supervisory board members. Id. In 1965 the Joint Stock Company Act set the minimum board size
at three members. Id. at 119. All worker representatives are selected through a general election
process. Id.
70. Id. at 119; see also Richardi, supra note 13, at 42. If two seats exist, they must be filled
by one white collar worker and one blue collar worker. See Zakson, supra note 31, at 119.
71. See Zakson, supra note 31, at 119. Typically, employees of the enterprise fill these posi-
tions as well. Id.
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employees a statutory right to representation on supervisory boards
within the enterprise. In reality, however, the one-third representation
provided for under the Act has failed to achieve actual co-determina-
tion, but rather has given workers a mere consultative function. 2
In contrast, shareholders and workers of businesses under the Co-
determination Act of 1976 share equally the seats on supervisory
boards.73 The number of workers that are employed in these enterprises
determines both the size of the supervisory board and the election pro-
cedures.74 If the company employs fewer than 10,000 workers, then the
supervisory board should consist of twelve members. 5 If the company
employs between 10,000 and 20,000 workers, then the board should
have sixteen members. 8 Finally, if the enterprise employs more than
20,000 employees, the supervisory board should have twenty members. 7
Within the seats designated for employee representatives, trade union
representatives should hold at least two seats if the board consists of six
to eight employee representatives, or three seats if the board consists of
ten employee representatives.
78
While the Co-determination Act appears to establish parity on the
supervisory boards, this parity may be illusory in many instances be-
cause the Act affords a special role to the chairman.79 A two-thirds ma-
jority of the qualified board members elects the chairman, but if this
majority cannot be attained, the shareholder representatives elect the
chairman. 0 This provision by itself does not defeat parity; however, ar-
ticle 29 provides that in the result of a board deadlock on any issue, the
chairman will be given two votes to break the tie.8 ' Consequently, the
72. Id.; see also Wiedemann, supra note 32, at 80. Since 1952, the Act's one-third co-
determination requirement has influenced 2000-3000 companies. Id.
73. See Zakson, supra note 31, at 119. The "legal form" of the companies to which the Act
applies are the corporation (Aktiengesellschaft), the limited partnership (Kommanditgesellschaft
auf Aktien), or a company with limited liability (Gesellschaft mit beschrankter Haftung). See
Kolvenbach, supra note 14, at 164; see also Lutter, supra note 11, at 154.
74. If the enterprise employs 8000 or fewer workers, election of employee representatives
occurs through a general election. See Wiedemann, supra note 32, at 79. If the enterprise employs
more than 8000 workers, electoral delegates select the representatives. Id. A majority of voters can
opt for a general election. See Kolvenbach, supra note 13, at 164.
75. See Kolvenbach, supra note 13, at 164. The board will have six employee representatives
and six shareholder representatives. Id.
76. Id. The board will have eight employee representatives and eight shareholder representa-
tives. Id.
77. Id. The board will have 10 employee representatives and 10 shareholder representatives.
Id.
78. See Richardi, supra note 13, at 40; see also Zakson, supra note 31, at 119. The trade
union representatives may or may not come from within the enterprise. See Richardi, supra note
13, at 40.
79. See Zakson, supra note 31, at 120-21.
80. See Wiedemann, supra note 32, at 80.
81. See Zakson, supra note 31, at 120-21; see also Richardi, supra note 13, at 40. The pur-
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shareholder representatives possess a slight advantage in supervisory
board determinations despite the virtually unlimited access to informa-
tion and consultation of employee representatives on a broad range of
managerial decisions.
A variety of constitutional challenges have been raised against the
Co-determination Act. The strongest constitutional argument was that
because unions would be represented in negotiations on both sides of
the table, the results would be unilaterally dictated, which would un-
constitutionally restricting the shareholders' property rights.82 The
court rejected this challenge on the ground that the shareholders re-
tained an advantage due to the augmented voting power of the
chairman."3
Another argument yet to be fully explored concerns the confidenti-
ality of management information. While management must give the su-
pervisory board unlimited access to information, the board members, in
turn, must keep the information secret.84 Trade unions, however, expect
full reports from their representatives on all board negotiations.8 " Con-
sequently, the Co-determination Act requires members to balance co-
determination principles and the interests of the shareholders.8 "
Thus, the primary vehicle of worker participation in Germany is
the works council.8 7 Industry-wide collective bargaining and representa-
tion on supervisory boards allow workers some influence in economic
and managerial decisions. The majority of decisionmaking that relates
to the individual worker, however, occurs at the enterprise level be-
tween management and the works council.88
pose of this second vote is to ensure the ability of the enterprise to function. See Wiedemann,
supra note 32, at 80.
82. See Wiedemann, supra note 32, at 84.
83. Id. at 85. In a 1979 decision of the Federal Constitutional Court in Karlsruhe, the court
determined that the "double vote" protected shareholders' value. Therefore, no constitutional vio-
lation occurred. See Kolvenbach, supra note 14, at 166. This result suggests that "full parity"
through the abolition of the double vote would violate the ownership guarantee in the German
constitution. Id.
84. See Kolvenbach, supra note 14, at 167.
85. Id.
86. Id. A related problem with the present laws governing supervisory boards concerns the
concentration of people on supervisory boards. One person can serve on as many as 10 supervisory
boards. See Wiedemann, supra note 32, at 87. While board members are not allowed to divulge
information acquired as a result of sitting on a board, unions and lawyers claim special status
because of the fiduciary nature of their supervisory capacities. Id. The result may be a directorate
network in violation of antitrust principles. Id. at 88.
87. See Zakson, supra note 31, at 97. Statutorily mandated works councils serve as a "virtu-
ally universal ... worker participation mechanism." Id.
88. As one commentator has noted:
[I]t is not difficult to see that employees in fact participate through the works council. Co-
determination on the supervisory board only rounds that participation off, as it were, and in
some respects even leads to duplication. And this worker participation in the running of
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The German system of industrial relations is founded on the con-
cept of co-determination, which advocates democracy in both the politi-
cal and economic spheres.8 9 The system has an underlying ideology of
co-operation that pervades all labor-management relations.9 0 This ide-
ology dates back to the mid-1900s91 and has enabled Germany to main-
tain a relatively stable labor-management relationship. 2
III. JAPAN
After World War II the Allies imposed their collective bargaining
concepts and techniques on the Japanese.93 Consequently, comparing
the structure of the Japanese and American systems of labor relations
reveals a fundamental identity in form.' Although Japanese labor law
has the same components as American labor law, the systems actually
operate quite differently.9 5 Unlike the adversarial nature of United
States labor relations, negotiations between management and labor in
Japan generally reflect an atmosphere of cooperation. 8
A. Statutory Developments
Japan's constitution lays the fundamental groundwork for Japa-
nese labor relations9 7 by providing "that all workers have the funda-
works and company in accordance with the rules of the works constitution, which has ensued
from long experience and tradition, is the true reason for the large degree of stability in social
relations in the Federal Republic of Germany.
Lutter, supra note 11, at 159.
89. See Zakson, supra note 31, at 122.
90. Id. at 122-23.
91. As one commentator has noted:
Because of critical conditions following . . . WWII, [when] German employers ... accepted
the principle that employees should have the right to participate in one form or another in
almost all of the decisions of the enterprise. The unions likewise. . . accepted the view that
the interests of the employees and employers were not necessarily antagonistic and that they
should share the responsibilities for management of the enterprise.
Id. at 123 (quoting Summers, Worker Participation in the U.S. and West Germany: A Compara-
tive Study from an American Perspective, 28 Am. J. Comp. L. 367, 383 (1980)).
92. See Lutter, supra note 11, at 160.
93. See Duff, Japanese and American Labor Law: Structural Similarities and Substantive
Differences, 9 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 629 (1984).
94. Some fundamental differences are apparent. First, the Japanese judiciary is charged with
the responsibility for recognizing and guaranteeing human rights. Second, the Japanese judiciary
has the affirmative duty to promote citizens' economic and social welfare and to protect citizens'
fundamental rights. Third, the Japanese are afforded additional "fundamental rights," including
the right to an education, the right to work, and the right to act collectively. Note, Worker Partici-
pation In Japan: The Temporary Employee and Enterprise Unionism, 7 Comp. LAB. L. 365, 370
(1986).
95. See Duff, supra note 93, at 629.
96. See Note, supra note 94, at 371.
97. Id. at 365.
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mental right to organize, negotiate collective bargaining agreements,
and to strike."9 8 Apart from the constitution itself, three primary laws
play significant roles in governing management-labor relations: the La-
bor Relations Adjustment Act,99 the Labor Standards Act,100 and the
Labor Union Act.10 1
The Labor Relations Adjustment Act and the Labor Standards Act
are the basis for labor-management relations. The Labor Relations Ad-
justment Act provides for "conciliation, mediation, arbitration, and
non-violent strikes."102 The Labor Standards Act addresses the funda-
mental issues concerning working conditions. For example, the Labor
Standards Act establishes a full-time workweek of forty-eight hours
with a provision for minimum paid vacation. 103 This legislation also sets
forth guidelines for the employment of minors, and prohibits minors
and women from working in dangerous jobs.'
04
By far the most important statute for labor-management relations
is the Labor Union Act. This statute's purposes are (1) to place workers
in an equal bargaining position with their employer, (2) to protect au-
tonomous self-organization by workers, and (3) to encourage collective
bargaining.105 More specifically, the Act prohibits management interfer-
ence during union formation and imposes an affirmative duty on man-
agement to bargain with the union. 0 6 In addition, employers who
discharge or discriminate against employees exercising their legal rights
are subject to penalties.
10 7
Article 7(2) of chapter II of the Labor Union Act provides that an
employer who refuses to bargain collectively "without fair and appro-
priate reasons" shall be guilty of an unfair labor practice. 0 8 While ex-
pressly providing for unfair labor practice sanctions against
management, the Act, however, does not have any explicit penalties
against unions for their unfair labor practices. 09 In addition, the Act
prohibits an employer from claiming indemnity from a trade union for
98. Id. (paraphrasing article 29 of the Japanese constitution).
99. Called the Rodo Kankoi Chosei Ho, this law was passed on September 27, 1946. See
Duff, supra note 93, at 630.
100. Called the Rodo Kijun Ho, this law was passed on April 7, 1947. Id.





106. Id. at 631.
107. Id.
108. Id. This provision suggests that management may refuse to negotiate for "fair and ap-





damages incurred during a strike or dispute, which are "proper acts."'110
Unlike United States labor laws, the three Japanese labor statutes
develop only a vague framework for labor-management relations and
leave most issues to be negotiated between management and the work-
ers."' Given that the scope of collective bargaining and the workers'
role in management decisionmaking must be resolved by the individual
employer, employee representation and participation may vary from en-
terprise to enterprise.1 2
B. Features of the Japanese Labor System
1. Union Structure
The union structure in Japan is a highly decentralized," 3 three-
tiered hierarchy. The enterprise union is the foundation for Japanese
unionism." 4 Typically, enterprise unions within the same industry join
in industry-wide federations.""5 Four national centers are above the in-
dustrial federation level." 6
Enterprise unionism began soon after World War II, when workers
had to be organized quickly." 7 These unions have remained because
they suit Japan's rule of lifetime employment under which an em-
ployee's only concern lies with the vitality of the enterprise." 8 Enter-
prise unions function as independent entities at the job site or
enterprise." 9 While over 70,000 unions exist, ninety percent are enter-
prise unions, representing over 12.5 million workers, or approximately
thirty-three percent of the workforce.1
20
Given that most Japanese unions are isolated to a single plant,
most bargaining occurs at the local level.' 2 ' As a result, management
and labor have a cooperative relationship because the union's existence
depends on the success of the enterprise. 22 The relationship between
management and unions reflects the harmonious relationship between
110. Id. at 630. "Proper acts" do not include acts of violence or interruption of industrial
safety precautions. Id.
111. See Note, supra note 94, at 371.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 378.
114. Id. "Unlike American unions which are primarily organized according to industry or
craft, Japanese unions are generally organized not on the basis of job skills, but according to em-
ployment in a single firm." Id. (emphasis added).
115. Id. at 383.
116. Id. at 385.
117. Id. at 378.
118. Id.
119. See Duff, supra note 93, at 634.
120. See Bairstow, supra note 37, at 519.
121. See Duff, supra note 93, at 634.
122. Id. (quoting T. HANAMI, LABOUR LAW AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN JAPAN 49 (1979)).
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management and labor. Union administration often relies on employer
records.123 Moreover, employers often "subsidize" 12' union activities by
paying wages for employees to negotiate during working hours.125 Addi-
tionally, employers encourage union service by paying wages to part-
time union officials.
126
With the primary focus on cooperative negotiations at the enter-
prise level, collective bargaining in Japan is often fragmentary. 27 While
critics have advocated a confrontational approach to negotiations,' 28 en-
terprise unions have been extremely successful at implementing negoti-
ations on a variety of issues that are not statutorily mandated.' 29 This
success is another consequence of employer recognition that employee
cooperation provides an integral component to a thriving business. 3
Enterprise unions within the same industry often join together to
form a centralized confederation.' 3 ' These industrial federations do not
engage in collective bargaining, but rather coordinate the interests of
the member enterprises. 132 The industrial federations also provide their
members with information and consultation.133
One of the primary functions of industrial federations involve their
activities at the Spring Wage Offensive (Shunto) held each year be-
tween June and December.13 4 The Shunto objectives are to broaden and
coordinate bargaining on the enterprise level, while retaining enterprise
unionism. s' 5 The industrial federations negotiate with employer associa-
tions in order to secure uniform wage rate increases, working hours, and
holidays throughout the industry. 3 6
123. See Note, supra note 94, at 380.
124. Subsidies for union expenses are subject to the provisions of the Trade Union Law. Id.
125. Id. at 380.
126. Id. at 381. The Trade Union Law prohibits full-time union officials to be paid by the
employer. See id. Consequently, employers encourage full-time union activity by implementing
leaves of absence whereby the job remains open until the employee fulfills his union obligations.
Id.
127. See Duff, supra note 93, at 634; see also T. HANAMI, supra note 22, at 105-06.
128. See Note, supra note 94, at 382. One unique aspect of Japanese labor law is that "all
bona fide unions have the right to bargain, and employers must bargain with all bona fide unions."
See Duff, supra note 93, at 633 (emphasis in original).
129. See Note, supra note 94, at 382.
130. Id.
131. See Duff, supra note 94, at 634; see also T. HANAMI, supra note 122, at 105-06. These
centralized confederations are called tan-san. See Note, supra note 94, at 383.
132. See Note, supra note 94, at 383-84.
133. Id. at 385.
134. See Bairstow, supra note 37, at 520; see also Note, supra note 94, at 384.
135. See Bairstow, supra note 37, at 520.
136. See Note, supra note 94, at 384-85.
[B]ut their control over wage levels in individual enterprises is indirect and incomplete be-
cause the spring offensive negotiations only decide the amount of percentage of the wage
increase for that year; the basic wage from which the increase is calculated or onto which the
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The four national centers comprise the third tier of Japanese
unionism. 13 7 These centers primarily perform a consultative function, in
addition to promoting the political party they represent. 3 8 While the
national centers may have influence in policy matters, they have little
power in collective bargaining. 39
2. Structure of the Labor Force
The structural foundation of the Japanese labor force is a dual em-
ployment system. On one level the permanent employees enjoy the ben-
efits of lifetime employment and seniority wages secured by the
enterprise union.140 On a lower level, temporary employees, because of
their lack of organization, possess few job benefits and no job secur-
ity.1 4 ' The primary cause of the sharp distinction between permanent
and temporary workers is the exclusion by the enterprise unions of tem-
porary workers, who are left with no means to improve their bargaining
positions.1
42
Permanent employees possess a high degree of job security.43 They
are guaranteed steady work advancement, ongoing education and voca-
tional training, and retirement plans.4 In addition, permanent employ-
ees are the last to be laid off or transferred. 45 The enterprise union,
composed solely of permanent employees, works with management to
ensure this specialized position for permanent employees. 46 In contrast,
increase is added has already been decided by enterprise bargaining.
Id. at 385.
137. Id. at 385. "A distinctive feature of the Japanese labor scene is the four national centers.
... The four centers differ ideologically and in organizational philosophy." Bairstow, supra note
37, at 519; see also T. HANAMI, supra note 122, at 106-07.
138. See Note, supra 94, at 386. The four centers are the General Council of Trade Unions of
Japan (Sohyo), the Japanese Confederation of Labor (Domei), the Federation of Independent Un-
ions of Japan (Churitsuroren), and the National Federation of Industrial Organizations (Shin-
sanbetsu). Id. at 386-87.
139. "Basically, political strategy is the responsibility of the national centers and federations,
but it is the enterprise unions that actually hold the power in collective bargaining with employ-
ers." Bairstow, supra note 37, at 519.
140. See Note, supra note 94, at 374-75.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 366.
143. Id. at 374.
144. Id. Benefits negotiated by the enterprise union are only given to permanent employees
and often are as high as 50% of a regular employee's yearly salary. Id. at 377. In addition, the
retirement allowance, which may be paid at voluntary withdrawal or replacement, equals nearly 40
months of salary in many instances. Id.
145. Id. at 374. Because wages are tied primarily to length of service rather than the level of
skills acquired or performed, the temporary employee, whose length of service in any particular
enterprise is relatively short, often receives a low salary compared to the permanent employees. Id.
at 376.
146. Id. at 374.
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temporary employees share none of the job stability afforded to perma-
nent employees. Rather, temporary employees move from company to
company and are hired only for a limited position at any one time. 47
Commentators often attribute Japanese worker loyalty to the en-
terprise to a system embracing lifetime employment 148 and wage pay-
ment based on seniority. 49 These features of the Japanese labor
system, however, frustrate the interests of the temporary worker whose
interests may be sacrificed both to accommodate market fluctuations
and to protect the status of the permanent employee. 150 Temporary em-
ployees also comprise a large percentage of the workforce."5 Certain
classes of employees have an extremely high concentration of temporary
employees. 152 One commentator has stated that organized representa-
tion for the temporary employee may be the only way to obviate the
large wage and benefit differentials that divide the Japanese labor
force.
153
3. Ideological, Social, and Cultural Underpinnings
A critical element in understanding labor-management relations in
Japan is the ideological, social, and cultural foundation upon which the
laws and the labor relations operate. The Japanese emphasis on social
harmony creates an overarching ideological system within which the
laws and labor-management relations function.154 For example, a per-
manent position in the labor force reinforces the cultural emphasis on
emotional loyalty to group membership. 55 The Japanese system, how-
ever, also breeds corporate paternalism toward permanent employees. 15
Heritage and culture play an equally important role in the Japa-
nese attitude toward labor-management relations. 57 Due in part to
their homogeneous population, the Japanese tend to share traditional
values that emphasize the family.5 a In addition, Japan's primary reli-
147. Id. at 366.
148. Lifetime employment is called Shushin koyo. Id. at 373.
149. Wages based on seniority are called Nenko. Id.
150. Id. at 366. One commentator concluded that "[u]ntil these temporary workers are given
an opportunity to participate as an organized entity in enterprise decision-making, the concept of
worker participation and industrial democracy in Japan remains only an illusion for a favored
majority." Id. at 367.
151. Id. at 366-67.
152. Id. In 1981, women constituted approximately one-third of the labor force. Id. at 367.
Yet, they held almost 70% of the temporary positions. Id. at 367.
153. Id. at 367.
154. See Comment, supra note 1, at 605.
155. Id. at 594-95.
156. Id. at 595.
157. Id. at 587.
158. Id. at 590-91. Japan's "group consciousness makes social approval critically important
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gion, Shinto, encourages passivism in response to life's circumstances.15
Lifetime employment, combined with corporate paternalism, is a natu-
ral outgrowth of the cultural heritage on which Japan was founded. 1 0
This heritage helps to explain the traditional aversion of the Japa-
nese toward law and the legal resolution of disputes.16 ' With little con-
sciousness of individual legal rights, the Japanese do not rely heavily on
the law to settle disputes.6 2 Rather, the parties expect to resolve
problems between themselves. 6 s Thus, Japanese managers are accus-
tomed to relatively docile unions partly because their society encour-
ages parties to reach a consensus rather than settle disputes through
overt legal conflict.1
6 4
C. Mechanisms of Worker Participation
The primary mechanisms for worker participation in Japan are col-
lective bargaining and joint consultation.'6 5 As the traditional mecha-
nism for worker participation, collective bargaining operates as a form
of indirect participation through the union's elected representative. 166
Because the statutes governing collective bargaining fail to specify the
for one's status and self-respect." Id. at 591.
159. Id. at 589.
160. Id. at 595.
161. Id. at 592. "To take someone to court to guarantee the protection of one's own interests,
or to be mentioned in court is a shameful thing; ... In a word, Japanese do not like law." See
Duff, supra note 93, at 637.
162. See Comment, supra note 1, at 593. Another unique aspect of the Japanese legal system
is that stare decisis does not bind judges in their determinations of disputes. See Duff, supra note
93, at 632. Prior to the end of World War II, a system of "social rules" (called giri) governed
Japanese labor law. Id. at 631. Relying on these rules, judges in Japan do not adhere strictly to
Japanese law, but rather search for a reasonable resolution of the existing dispute. Id. at 632.
While this "result-oriented approach" might lead to many inconsistencies, it also may provide
greater flexibility to resolve complex labor relations problems. Id.
163. See Comment, supra note 1, at 593. As one commentator has noted:
With the exception of lawyers and persons with some knowledge of law, Japanese generally
conceive of law as an instrument of constraint that the state uses when it wishes to impose its
will. Law is thus synonymous with pain or penalty. To an honorable Japanese, the law is
something that is undesirable, even detestable, something to keep as far away from as possi-
ble. To never use the law, or be involved with the law, is the normal hope of honorable people.
Duff, supra note 93, at 637 (quoting Y. NODA, INTRODUCTION TO JAPANESE LAW 159-60 (1976)).
164. See Duff, supra note 93, at 637. This docile nature is also partly the result of lifetime
employment. Because union members' interests are inextricably bound to the enterprise, their ac-
tions must be restrained in order to prevent threats to the long-term viability of the enterprise. Id.
at 636 (quoting OFFICE OF ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INDUS-
TRIAL RELATIONS SYSTEMS: SOME IMPLICATIONS OF JAPANESE EXPERIENCE 25-26 (1977)).
165. See Kuwahara, Worker Participation in Decisions Within Undertakings in Japan, 5
Comp. LAB. L. 51, 53 (1982).
166. See Note, supra note 94, at 389. Because the union only has permanent employee mem-
bers, the interests of the temporary employee probably are unrepresented in collective bargaining.
Id. See generally T. HANAMI, supra note 122, at 107-17.
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scope of the negotiations,167 the discretion of the parties and the man-
dates of the industry determine the limits of collective bargaining."6 "
Despite the lack of statutorily defined scope, employers, emphasizing
cooperation, have been receptive to negotiations on a variety of is-
sues. 69 Typically, collective bargaining addresses issues like wages, bo-
nuses, and retirement allowances, as well as personnel issues. 17 1 Some
issues, however, including mergers and closures, generally are excluded
from the scope of collective bargaining.1
7 '
By far the most prevalent form of worker participation,7 2 joint
consultation functions as collective bargaining in small- and medium-
sized enterprises, while playing a preliminary role to collective bargain-
ing in large scale enterprises. 7 3 Similar to the German works council,
joint consultation provides a flow of information between labor and
management and gives unionized employees an opportunity to partici-
pate in management decisions. 17 4 In large enterprises, joint consultation
committees organize at either the plant or workshop level. In small en-
terprises, joint consultation operates on a more informal basis.
75
The scope of joint consultation often parallels the issues subject to
collective bargaining.7  Typically, issues are addressed initially in joint
167. See supra notes 111-12 and accompanying text.
168. See Note, supra note 94, at 390.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 390-91. Personnel issues include such questions as hirings, firings, transfers, holi-
days, work hours, and other similar issues. Id. at 391.
171. Id. at 391 n.95. "In general, production and organization issues relating to new technol-
ogy, managerial changes, relocation, mergers, closures, and subcontracting are not addressed dur-
ing collective bargaining." Id.
172. See Kuwahara, supra note 165, at 51. "Joint consultation practices are really an infor-
mal process of negotiation, and they include collective bargaining, meetings to explain managerial
issues, and conferences for the exchange of information or for communication." Id. at 58. A 1977
survey by the National Labor Relations Board found that 82.3% of all workers were represented
by joint consultation councils. Id. Large enterprises were much more likely than small ones to have
joint enterprises: "92.6% of the large enterprises and 54.7% of the small enterprises provide joint
consultation machinery." Id. "Almost half the union officials preferred joint consultation over col-
lective bargaining. Approximately 2% of them favored joint consultation instead of collective bar-
gaining. 50% gave mutual understanding as the reason for their preference; 25% gave sincere
negotiation as the reason." Id. at 60. Statistics reveal an increasing trend toward the use of joint
consultation machinery instead of, or as a supplement to, collective bargaining. Id.
173. See Note, supra note 94, at 392.
174. Id. at 392-93. On the industry and national levels, the enterprise union acts as the
worker's representative. Id. at 392.
175. Id. at 392. Because no statutory restriction limits the scope of joint consultation, the
issues of joint consultation often overlap with issues of collective bargaining. See Kuwahara, supra
note 165, at 52. Joint consultation in Japan usually addresses productivity issues as well as terms
and conditions of employment even though, theoretically, collective bargaining pertains to work
conditions and joint consultation with productivity. Id. at 51.
176. See Note, supra note 94, at 394.
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consultation.1 If an impasse occurs, then the issue goes into collective
bargaining negotiations.178 The dual function of joint consultation, con-
sulting and bargaining, in small- and medium-sized enterprises, results
from a loose affiliation between the enterprise unions and the industry
unions and, in some instances, the absence of a formal system for effec-
tive collective bargaining.'7 9 In addition, strong employee attachment to
the enterprise fosters harmonious industrial relations, which eliminate
the need for intense collective bargaining.
180
At least two types of joint consultation exist at the enterprise level.
The first variation covers policies on safety and welfare.' s ' On these is-
sues, the union does not actively negotiate, but rather retains veto
power in order to encourage employer modification of the proposals.' 8
A second form of joint consultation concerns the union's role as a non-
binding advisor. 8 ' In this role, joint consultation reflects the employer's
desire to include the union in decisionmaking.8
Joint consultation also occurs on industry-wide and national levels.
Industry-wide joint consultation committees address common issues
raised across the industry.'85 On the national level, joint consultation
committees serve as advisory commissions to the government. s1 8
A few other worker participation mechanisms exist in Japan, al-
though on a much smaller scale. Organized informally on the workshop
level, quality control circles encourage employee input on plant im-
provement issues.'87 These groups, however, have little impact on deci-
sionmaking because they are organized at a relatively low level of the
enterprise. 8 Additionally, efforts to expand direct employee influence
through participation on management boards have not fared well,
largely because of Japan's traditional approach of indirect
participation."8 9
177. Id.
178. Id.; see also Kuwahara, supra note 165, at 52-53.
179. See Kuwahara, supra note 165, at 52.
180. See generally Note, supra note 94, at 394-95.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 393-95.
183. Id. at 395.
184. Id. The purpose of this form of joint consultation is not to encourage collective decision-
making, but rather to establish a broader understanding of management policies. Id.
185. Id. The focus is on such issues as "industrial re-organization, technological advance-
ments within the industry, and international trade conflicts." Id. at 396. The negotiations may
even extend to questions of industrial pollution. Id.
186. Id. at 396.
187. Id. at 397.
188. Id. "For the temporary employee, this form of discussion represents one of the only
opportunities for participation in the decision-making process in the enterprise." Id.
189. Id. at 398-99. One major Japanese company, the Sankei Newspaper Co., has an enter-
prise union representative on its Board of Directors. Id. at 387.
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In summary, worker participation in Japan takes the form of indi-
rect employee representation primarily through joint consultation.
While collective bargaining is a distinct form of worker participation,
joint consultation often serves a double function, including consultation
on issues of productivity and bargaining for terms and conditions of
employment. Typically, no significant difference exists between formal
collective bargaining and consultation, largely because of the atmo-
sphere of cooperation surrounding Japanese collective bargaining and
the determination by the parties of collective bargaining topics. 190 This
cooperative, informal approach to labor-management relations in Japan
is a product of ideological, social, and cultural attitudes that emphasize
the harmonious resolution of conflicts.' 9 '
IV. SWEDEN
Credited with the "most far-reaching program of worker participa-
tion in Europe,' 192 Sweden, like the United States, emphasizes collec-
tive bargaining in its labor relations laws. 19 However, Sweden's
centralization of collective bargaining agreements on a national level9 4
differs from the United States' emphasis on industry or trade unions.9 5
In general terms, the Swedish labor system is founded on the belief that
society no longer can support unilateral employer decisionmaking re-
garding work direction and distribution.'96
A. Statutory Developments
Since the late 1960s, several legislative enactments have shaped the
Swedish labor relations system. The Basic Agreement and the Agree-
ment Regarding Works Councils were the primary statutes addressing
the trade unions' desires for industrial and economic democracy. 97
190. Id. at 381.
191. See generally Comment, supra note 1, at 594-99. While strikes do occur in Japan, they
are usually short in duration, with most lasting only a couple of days. See Duff, supra note 93, at
635. Strikes are a "demonstration of feeling rather than a weapon with which to press the manage-
ment after negotiations have reached a deadlock." Id.; see also Comment, supra note 1, at 603-06.
192. Steuer, Employee Representation on the Board: Industrial Democracy or Interlocking
Directorate?, 16 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 255, 263 (1977).
193. See Zakson, supra note 31, at 96.
194. See Summers, supra note 7, at 215.
195. See supra Special Project Note, Hybrid Employees, at note 15 and accompanying text.
196. See Zakson, supra note 31, at 111. See generally Schmidt, Industrial Action: The Role
of Trade Unions and Employers' Associations, in INDUSTRIAL CONFLICT. A COMPARATIVE LEGAL
SURVEY (B. Aaron & K. Wedderburn eds. 1972).
197. Id. at 102-03. The Basic Agreement and the Act Regarding Works Councils gave Swed-
ish workers a "voice in their work environment through collective bargaining agreements and
worker-employee consultative bodies." Id. at 103. The Basic Agreement set forth guidelines for
union-management relations, including requirements for union notification regarding employer-
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During the 1970s, in response to union demands for a more effective
and influential role in workplace decisionmaking, the Swedish govern-
ment passed two laws establishing greater employee participation in
both the public and private economic sectors. 9" The Board Representa-
tion for Workers Act of 197311 provided employees with a statutory
right to worker representation on the board of directors of joint stock
companies, as well as specified enterprises with twenty-five or more em-
ployees. 200 The Act on the Joint Regulation of Working Life of 1976
expanded workers' decisionmaking influence by increasing the scope of
negotiable issues in collective bargaining.2 1 Despite the traditional cen-
tralization of collective bargaining agreements, these statutes in partic-
ular marked an effort by the Swedish legislature to expand the scope of
worker participation to influence all decisionmaking within the
enterprise.20 2
B. Union Structure
Important characteristics of Swedish labor law are the homogeniety
and strength of both unions and employers in national labor rela-
tions.20 3 The growth of Swedish trade unions dates back to 1898 with
the formation of the Swedish Trade Union Confederation (LO).2 °4 The
present membership of the twenty-five affiliated blue collar unions20 5
totals approximately two million workers, over half the working popula-
tion.206 Centralization of employers in collective bargaining also has
been achieved. The Swedish Employers' Confederation (SAF), founded
in 1902, dominates the private sector labor market with over 38,000
member companies.20 7 Thus, the trend in Sweden has been toward a
planned dismissals. See Summers, supra note 7, at 186. Additionally, the union could request ne-
gotiations concerning dismissals, but the ultimate decision remained with the employer. Id. The
Works Council Agreements superceded the Basic Agreement's provisions concerning worker dis-
missal, but allowed only for information and consultation. Id.
198. See Zakson, supra note 31, at 103; see also Eiger, The Expanding Scope of Public Bar-
gaining in Sweden, 20 INDUS. REL. 335 (1981).
199. See Bergqvist, Worker Participation in Decisions Within Undertakings in Sweden, 5
COMp. LAB. L. 65, 71 (1982) (discussing amendments passed in 1976).
200. Id. at 71.
201. See Eiger, supra note 198, at 335. While the Act covers both the public and private
sectors, only public sector negotiations have been successful. Id.
202. A sharpening of trade union attitudes occurred during the early 1970s, along with an
apparent shift of emphasis toward directing and influencing all decisionmaking within the enter-
prise. See Bergqvist, supra note 199, at 75.
203. Id. at 66.
204. Id.
205. See Bairstow, supra note 37, at 517.
206. See Bergqvist, supra note 199, at 67. Separate organizations represent white collar and
government employees. See Bairstow, supra note 37, at 517.
207. See Bergqvist, supra note 199, at 67. Separate organizations represent central, regional,
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centralization of bargaining and a coordination of trade union demands
in both the public and private sectors."'
A key factor in implementing centralized collective bargaining has
been the high percentage of union membership in the work force. Al-
most all blue collar workers and approximately seventy percent of white
collar employees were union members in 1980.209 Because a centrally
negotiated collective bargaining agreement covers virtually every em-
ployer,2 10 these agreements cover almost all Swedish employees under
collective bargaining agreements.2 1 1 The recent trend has been toward
decentralization, largely due to pressure by employers to emphasize in-
dustry groupings.212 Recent figures over the last fifteen years reveal a
decline in the number of trade unions represented by the LO from forty
to twenty-five. 1
C. Mechanisms of Worker Participation
The three primary mechanisms of worker participation in Sweden
are employee representation on corporate boards, centralized collective
bargaining through union representatives, and union representation in
negotiations with management at the enterprise level. Under the Act on
Board Representation for Employees in Limited Companies and Co-
Operative Associations (the Board Representation Act),214 employees
may elect representatives to sit on the boards of specified companies.1
In addition, the Act on the Joint Regulation of Working Life2 16 places
and local governmental bodies in the public sector. Id.
208. Id. at 67-68.
209. See Bairstow, supra note 37, at 517. Recent estimates suggest that as many as 95% of
blue collar and 75% of white collar workers are union members. See Summers, supra note 7, at
181.
210. See Summers, supra note 7, at 181.
211. Id. The proliferation of union membership reflects, in part, the lack of employer hostil-
ity to union growth, dating back to 1906. Id. at 184. In that year, the SAF and the LO established
the "December Compromise." Id. at 184. Under the Compromise, unions accepted expressed "lim-
its" on collective bargaining. Id. at 185. Specifically, the unions agreed to a provision in all collec-
tive bargaining agreements stating that "[t]he employer . . . retain[s] full control over decisions
about who should be assigned to what work, who should be promoted and transferred, who was to
be laid off or discharged, and how work was to be assigned and performed." Id. In return, the
employers expressly accepted the unions and collective bargaining. Id. The December Compro-
mise, with its limitation on the role of unions and the regulation of management prerogatives,
served as the model for future Swedish labor relations. Id. at 186.
212. See Bairstow, supra note 37, at 517-18.
213. Id. at 518. The declining membership in the LO also reflects changes in the economy
and technological advancements. Id.
214. For the full text of the Board Representation Act, see 3 LAW AND THE WEAKER PARTY
145-49 (A. Neal & A. Victorin eds. 1983).
215. See Zakson, supra note 31, at 103-04.
216. For the full text of the Joint Regulation Act, see 3 LAW AND THE WEAKER PARTY, supra
note 214, at 151-65.
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the trade union in a stronger position in collective bargaining with the
employer.217
1. Employee Representation on Corporate Boards
The Board Representation Act provides that in companies employ-
ing twenty-five or more persons, the employees may appoint two mem-
bers and two deputy members to serve on the company board of
directors.218 This representation applies even if only two shareholder-
nominated members sit on the board of directors.21 9 If the company has
only one shareholder-nominated member, the employees may appoint
only one wage earner member plus one deputy member.220 Appointment
of the chairperson of the board of directors occurs at the annual meet-
ing of shareholders. 221 This appointment procedure is significant be-
cause the chairperson has the deciding vote in deadlocked decisions of
the board.222 Under the Act, employee representatives and deputy
board members possess the right to attend board meetings and to speak
out about the issues discussed.23 Employee representatives have the
same rights as shareholder-nominated members, subject to certain
restrictions.224
The Board Representation Act provides management with a means
of communicating with trade unions and creating better labor-manage-
ment relations on a multilevel basis. 225 Representation on company
boards of directors provides employees with access to information and
insight into company operations.22 s In essence, the Board Representa-
tion Act reflects the Swedish commitment to employees serving as part-
ners in the enterprise.2
217. See Zakson, supra note 31, at 103-04.
218. Id. at 104; see also Summers, supra note 7, at 203. The Board Representation Act only
applies when at least 50% of an enterprise's employees are union members. See Zakson, supra
note 31, at 105. If board representation is instated, employee board members would remain even
though the number of employees might drop below the requisite number of 25. Id.; see also supra
note 214.
219. Id. at 104.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 104-05.
222. Id. at 104.
223. Id. at 105.
224. Id. Section 17 of the Board Representation Act precludes employee representatives from
participating in board decisions concerning (1) negotiations with trade unions, (2) notice to termi-
nate collective bargaining, and (3) industrial action. Id. at 105 n.75.
225. See Bergqvist, supra note 199, at 80.
226. Id.
227. See Summers, supra note 7, at 203.
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2. Centralized Collective Bargaining
The second method of worker participation in Sweden occurs
through the centralized negotiation of collective bargaining agreements.
Traditionally, national unions and national employers have bargained
collectively over wages and other economic conditions.228 Several factors
led to the development of centralized bargaining. First, after the legali-
zation of the "sympathetic lockout," the national union could partici-
pate in local disputes. 229 Second, by limiting collective bargaining to
economic terms, centralized bargaining became feasible.280 Third, with
an increasing number of unionized workers, centralized bargaining
avoids the problems associated with "wage wars" between enterprises in
the same industry.231 Finally, after the centralization of employers into
the SAF, unions had to consolidate in order to exert influence against
the employers.23 2 This high degree of centralization and a non-interven-
tionist legislative role has caused collective agreements to proliferate as
a means to regulate labor-management relations.23 The centralization
of collective bargaining in Sweden, however, also has operated to re-
move decisionmaking from the individual union members.234
3. Union-Management Negotiations at the Enterprise Level
The most prevalent and pervasive form of worker participation in
Sweden occurs through union negotiation with employers,23 5 which
often culminates in collective bargaining agreements at the enterprise
level.238 Legislative reforms during the 1970s were directed primarily at
strengthening the power of trade unions as worker representatives in
order to establish collective bargaining as the primary means to secure





233. See Bergqvist, supra note 199, at 69.
234. See Summers, supra note 7, at 215.
235. Called Medbestammande in Swedish, this form of worker participation establishes a
system of labor-management equality in decisionmaking by imposing on employers the broad duty
to negotiate. See Zakson, supra note 31, at 96. Four main factors underlie this form of worker
participation. First, the statutory rules set forth only an outline for change, which the parties
themselves must gradually implement. Id. at 111. Second, the joint regulation is a democratic pro-
cess; the employees, therefore, are represented as a group without individualized attention. Id. at
111-12. Third, the Act is not intended to interfere with profitmaking; rather, the Act is designed to
enhance profitmaking through greater efficiency in decisionmaking. Id. at 112. Finally, employee
participation is intended to decrease employee alienation and increase productivity and general
satisfaction. Id.
236. See generally Bergqvist, supra note 199, at 66.
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workers' influence on their employer's business and decisions.3s The
Act on the Joint Regulation of Working Life (the Joint Regulation Act)
was the most significant of these legislative enactments.238 As originally
enacted in 1973, the Joint Regulation Act granted employees, through
their union representative, the general right to negotiate with respect to
wages and conditions of employment.3 " In 1976 the Act was amended
to expand the right of negotiation to all issues concerning work organi-
zation and company management.
240
More specifically, section 11 of the Act imposes on the employer
the "primary duty" to negotiate before implementing any action.241 In
addition to this duty to initiate negotiations, employers must provide
broad access to company information relating to the issues that are sub-
ject to negotiation.242 If negotiations between management and the en-
terprise union representatives fail to resolve the issue, further
negotiations will be held between the management and the central
union organization.24 Thus, the Joint Regulation Act represents an at-
tempt to substitute a bilateral decisionmaking approach for unilateral
employer decisionmaking. 44 Once both levels of negotiations conclude,
however, the employer retains the ultimate right to decide the issue,
unless the parties agree to the contrary.245
Possibly the most important feature of the Joint Regulation Act is
section 32, which provides for a collective agreement beyond the tradi-
tional parameters of wage and economic terms.4 Section 32 allows
237. Id.
238. "Perhaps the single most important piece of legislation in the Medbestammande area,"
the Joint Regulation Act purports to give workers an equal voice in decisionmaking. See Zakson,
supra note 31, at 106; see also supra note 216.
239. See Bergqvist, supra note 199, at 76.
240. Id. Section 10 specifically extends unions right of negotiation to "any matter relating to
the relationship between the employer and any member of the organization who is or has been
employed by that employer." See Summers, supra note 7, at 198. Under § 4, however, the em-
ployer may use his bargaining power to limit the scope of collective bargaining over the direction
and assignment of work. Id. at 200.
241. Id. at 198. An employer has the duty to initiate negotiations before implementing "an
'important alteration to his activity'" or any important change in the employees' conditions of
employment. Id. at 198-99. These activities include decisions concerning openings, closings, cut-
backs, relocations, and investment decisions of the enterprise. Id. at 199.
242. Id. at 200; see also Bergqvist, supra note 199, at 77; Zakson, supra note 31, at 108.
Unlike the NLRA, the Joint Regulation Act is founded on the belief that management and em-
ployees form a partnership in the enterprise. See Summers, supra note 7, at 203.
243. See Bergqvist, supra note 199, at 76-77.
244. See Zakson, supra note 31, at 107.
245. Id. at 108.
246. Section 32 of the Act specifically provides:
Between parties who conclude a collective agreement on wages and general conditions of em-
ployment there should, if the employer party so requests, also be concluded a collective agree-
ment on a right of joint regulation for the employees in matters which concern the conclusion
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union representatives to request that agreements be negotiated at the
enterprise level, giving employees, through their elected representatives,
a right of joint regulation over specifically enumerated matters concern-
ing the management of and work distribution in the enterprise.247 Thus,
section 32 reflects a philosophy of cooperative decisionmaking between
the employer and the employee, rather than an unyielding allegiance to
management prerogative.2 48 The Act does not set up a model of enter-
prise level co-determination, but rather allows the parties to negotiate
collective agreements that suit their particular needs.24 9 While the Act
may allow unions to request negotiations on collective agreements be-
yond the traditional scope of economic terms and conditions of employ-
ment, whether a collective agreement actually will be reached on the
enterprise level depends on the economic influence of -the enterprise
union at the bargaining table. 50 This limitation in section 32 has led at
least one commentator to note that while the employer no longer has
unfettered discretion in decisionmaking, the employer retains, subject
only to its own agreement to the contrary, "the ultimate power to direct
the enterprise." '251
A final mechanism of the Joint Regulation Act concerns priority of
interpretation. Prior to the passage of the Act, an employer's interpre-
tation of a collective bargaining agreement was controlling until a final
resolution of the dispute.252 The Act, however, provides that in the fol-
lowing three circumstances, employee interpretation controls during the
interim period of dispute: (1) during conflicts over collective agreements
on joint regulation; (2) during conflicts over collective bargaining provi-
sions concerning employee disciplinary measures; and (3) during con-
flicts over employees' contractual duty to work. 53
and termination of contracts of employment, the management and distribution of the work,
and the activities of the business in other respects.
In collective agreements on joint regulation the parties, observing sec. 3 of the Act, are
free to decide what decisions which would otherwise have been taken by the employer shall
instead be taken by representatives of the employees or by a body composed of representa-
tives of both parties.
Id. at 110; see also Bergqvist, supra note 199, at 77.
247. See Eiger, supra note 198, at 336.
248. See Bergqvist, supra note 199, at 77.
249. Id. According to one commentator, the law "should constitute only a framework whereas
the collective agreements should specify how co-determination is exercised in practical terms and
also how the scope of co-determination may be gradually extended." Id. at 78.
250. See Summers, supra note 7, at 179-80; see also Zakson, supra note 31, at 110 (stating
that "[iun the final analysis, therefore, the implications of the Act for the role of the worker in the
determination of workplace decisions depends on the demands of his or her union at the bargain-
ing table and its ability to back up these demands with industrial action" (emphasis in original)).
251. See Zakson, supra note 31, at 96.
252. Id. at 109.
253. Id. at 109 n.102.
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The Swedish system of worker participation in management deci-
sionmaking is a system of indirect participation of employees through
union representation.254 Yet, since the enactment of the Joint Regula-
tion Act, union representation of employees occurs at every level of the
labor market organization. Consequently, while participation is indirect,
employees acting through union representatives possess almost unlim-
ited access to information and a virtually unlimited role in the decision-
making process.255
V. HYPOTHETICAL WORKER PARTICIPATION ANALYSIS
2 5 6
With the structural framework of labor-management relations in
Germany, Japan, and Sweden as background, this section of the Special
Project Note illustrates how each of those systems would address a par-
ticular issue through its worker participation mechanisms. In addition,
the same issue is analyzed under the United States labor system. As-
sume Company A, a labor-intensive enterprise, is contemplating a
merger with Company B, a capital-intensive enterprise. If the merger
takes place, a large number of employees in Company A will lose their
jobs.
A. Federal Republic of GermanyM
57
In West Germany, the scope of collective bargaining agreements
has remained limited to economic issues like wages and hours. The
Works Constitution Act in 1972, however, granted works councils co-
determination rights in decisions relating to structural changes in the
enterprise, which specifically include proposed mergers. Consequently,
Company A must obtain the consent of the works council before imple-
menting any merger. If the works council refuses to consent to the
merger plan, Company A must either obtain the consent of the Labor
Court or engage the conciliation board in mediation with the works
council. In the absence of the Labor Court's consent, management and
the works council ultimately must reach an agreement on the proposed
merger. During the interim period, however, Company A is prohibited




Assuming the works council and management successfully reached
an agreement on the implementation of the proposed merger, the issue
254. See Summers, supra note 7, at 214-15.
255. Id. at 203.
256. For a similar hypothetical analysis of plant relocation decisionmaking in Germany, Swe-
den, and the United States, see Zakson, supra note 31, at 133-38.
257. See supra notes 11-92 and accompanying text.
258. See supra notes 53-58 and accompanying text.
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probably would come before the supervisory board for final ratification.
Even though employee representatives sit on the supervisory boards,
they serve only in a consultative capacity largely because of the voting
power of the shareholder-elected chairperson. Consequently, these rep-
resentatives probably would not be able to preclude the ratification of
the merger proposal even if they objected to the plan.
B. Japan
259
The scope of collective bargaining in Japan traditionally encom-
passes issues of wages, bonuses, and retirement allowances, as well as
personnel issues. Issues of mergers and closures, however, generally
have been excluded from the scope of collective bargaining agree-
ments.26 0 In contrast, joint consultation serves a dual function by ad-
dressing issues like terms and conditions of employment and
productivity. Because of the cooperative nature of labor-management
relations in Japan and management's general support of unions in en-
terprise decisionmaking, the issue of a proposed merger could be a topic
for joint consultation. Union representatives on the joint consultation
committees, however, probably would serve merely as a nonbinding ad-




Under the Swedish Joint Regulation Act, Company A would have
to initiate negotiations with the union before implementing any signifi-
cant change, including the merger plan. In addition, management would
have to provide the employees full access to information concerning the
proposal in order to enable the employees to engage in meaningful ne-
gotiations. If an agreement were not reached, then management also
would have to negotiate with the centralized union representatives. The
ultimate decision to merge, however, would remain with management in
the absence of a collective agreement to the contrary.2 63 Under section
32 of the Joint Regulation Act, when a collective bargaining agreement
addresses wages and other conditions of employment, employee repre-
sentatives may request collective agreement on a variety of issues relat-
ing to the termination of employment contracts, work distribution, and
259. See supra notes 93-191 and accompanying text.
260. See supra notes 170-71 and accompanying text.
261. See supra notes 176-84 and accompanying text.
262. See supra notes 192-255 and accompanying text.
263. See supra notes 238-45 and accompanying text.
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the management of other business activities.64 Therefore, if the union
had bargained for a collective agreement that gave the employees co-
determination rights in decisions involving merger proposals, manage-
ment no longer would retain the ultimate authority to implement uni-
laterally the merger plan.
D. United States
Under United States labor laws, the extent of worker participation
in the decision to merge depends on whether the merger issue is a
"mandatory" or "permissive" subject of collective bargaining.265 If the
merger issue is a mandatory subject of bargaining, upon the insistence
of either labor or management, the other party must bargain until an
impasse is reached.6 6 If the issue of merger is a permissive subject of
bargaining, however, neither party can force the other party into negoti-
ations.267 Consequently, the characterization of a collective bargaining
subject as either mandatory or permissive is virtually determinative of
union success or failure at forcing bargaining on the issue.268
With an emphasis on limiting the scope of mandatory bargaining,
and preserving the "management prerogative,26 9 the United States Su-
preme Court in First National Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB17 0 adopted
a balancing test for determining the scope of mandatory bargaining.
The Court held that management and workers must negotiate over de-
cisions having a substantial impact on the continued availability of em-
ployment only when the benefit to labor-management relations and the
collective bargaining process outweighs the additional burden placed on
the business. 27 1 Thus, the First National Maintenance balancing test
potentially places beyond the scope of mandatory bargaining many of
the key concerns of unions, including plant closings, relocations, and
264. See supra notes 246-51 and accompanying text.
265. See Zakson, supra note 31, at 98-99. See generally supra Special Project Note,
Mandatory and Permissive Subjects.
266. See Zakson, supra note 31, at 99.
267. Id. In addition, a party may not use economic pressure to coerce the other party into
bargaining over the permissive subject. Id.
268. Id. As one commentator noted:
The determination that a subject is permissive, therefore, has the consequence of taking such
a subject outside the collective bargaining arena unless the parties voluntarily decide to dis-
cuss it. Therefore, if unions seek to pursue worker participation as a collective bargaining
goal, the attachment of the label "mandatory" or "permissive" to the subject matter of such
efforts will have a marked effect on how successful their pursuit will be.
Id. (footnote omitted).
269. Id. at 95.
270. 452 U.S. 666 (1981); see also supra Special Project Note, Mandatory and Permissive
Subjects, at notes 63-75 and accompanying text.
271. First Nat'l Maintenance, 452 U.S. at 679.
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the like.27 2 Given the similarities, from the employees' point of view,
between a decision to merge and a decision to relocate, Company A
probably would not have to engage in mandatory collective bargaining
negotiations with the union before implementing the merger proposal.
On balance, the incremental benefits from union participation in the
decision to merge would appear not to outweigh Company A's interests
in issues unrelated to employment, especially managing capital invest-
ments and increasing economic profitability.273
VI. CONCLUSION
The labor-management relations systems in Germany, Japan, and
Sweden are largely a product of each nation's individual social, eco-
nomic, ideological, and political heritage.274 Each nation has success-
fully achieved relatively stable labor-management relations, which have
contributed to the development of strong national economies. In view of
the United States' declining share in world markets, changes in our sys-
tem of labor relations may be necessary to improve productivity and
profitability in American businesses. A country's collective bargaining
structure strongly influences labor costs, the degree of industrial har-
mony, and the general nature of labor-management relations, all of
which in turn affect employee efficiency and productivity.275 The ques-
tion remains: to what extent could the United States incorporate as-
pects of foreign industrial relations systems into its own system? This is
a question worthy of consideration.
Any contemplated changes in the United States labor-management
relations must conform to a certain extent to our social, economic, ideo-
logical, and political traditions.276 The history of labor relations in the
United States also must be taken into account. Assuming that changes
are desirable, several factors counsel against adopting the German, Jap-
anese, or Swedish model of labor relations in toto. The most obvious
factors include the general antagonism of American employers toward
272. See Zakson, supra note 31, at 95.
273. Company A's interest in
"manag[ing] its affairs unrelated to employment" (especially if such interests deal with "capi-
tal investments") and in making decisions focusing "only [on] the economic profitability" of
the facility would probably outweigh the "incremental benefit [to the process and/or purpose
of the Act] that might be gained through the union's participation in making the decision."
Id. at 138 (footnotes omitted) (quoting First Nat'l Maintenance, 452 U.S. at 677, 680, 686).
274. See Aaron, supra note 5, at 1263-64; see also Bairstow, supra 37, at 514 (stating that
collective bargaining mechanisms "must be assessed in the context of their geography, economic
location, culture, traditions and history").
275. See Bairstow, supra note 37, at 515.
276. See Aaron, supra note 5, at 1264. "[A]ttempts to graft onto our system patterns of
labor-management relationships that are based on quite different assumptions and practices from
those in this country simply will not work." Id.
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unions,2" the relatively low percentage of unionization in the United
States, the willingness of unions to strike and to resort to other eco-
nomic pressures, and the constant demands by unions for an expanded
scope of collective bargaining.
278
Despite these mitigating factors and general skepticism,7 United
States management recently has attempted to implement voluntary sys-
tems of cooperative decisionmaking.280 These arrangements, however,
arguably violate the adversarial system of labor relations established
under the NLRA.28l If changes in the United States labor relations sys-
tem ultimately are deemed desirable, one proposed solution within the
existing system would be to interpret section 8(d)'s wages, hours, and
terms and conditions of employment provision broadly in order to ex-
pand the scope of mandatory collective bargaining.28 2 By balancing la-
bor and management interests, the courts could expand the topics
within the purview of mandatory bargaining. 8 3 This approach would
avoid the difficulties of transplanting a foreign system of labor relations
that is premised on a different cultural and historical foundation, but at
the same time would provide an expansive role for worker participation.
Linda L. Rippey
277. This antagonism has not been alleviated despite some legislative enactments. See Sum-
mers, supra note 7, at 224.
278. See supra Special Project Note, Hybrid Employees, at note 3 and accompanying text;
Summers, supra note 7, at 224-25. As one commentator stated:
The history of employee representation schemes as "shams to forestall unionization and give
employees no real voice" has so colored both labor relations law in the United States, and
more particularly the law embodied in the Wagner Act, that any attempt to transplant [for-
eign] solutions would be difficult, if not impossible.
Id.
279. See Zakson, supra note 31, at 126.
280. Any move toward cooperative decisionmaking in the workplace may be at the expense of
individual worker rights.
281. See Merrifield, supra note 2, at 3. The most common form of cooperation has been a
"joint labor-management committee at the shop or plant level to work on improving productivity,
quality of product, and quality of worklife." Id. at 3.
282. See Comment, supra note 1, at 586.
283. See Zakson, supra note 31, at 133; supra Special Project Note, Mandatory and Permis-
sive Subjects, at notes 86-96 and accompanying text.
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Conclusion
Labor-management cooperative efforts are not an entirely new phe-
nomenon in American industry. Concerns over the productivity and
competitiveness of American companies, which recently have prompted
employers to consider cooperative labor schemes, have evoked similar
reactions in previous years.1 The presence of a "common enemy," for-
eign competition, encourages more harmonious relations between labor
and management and temporarily takes precedence over their underly-
ing power struggle.2
Unlike cooperative efforts of the past, however, current ventures
must contend with over a half century of interpretations of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act (the NLRA). While many observers applaud
the democratic ideals and prospects for industrial peace inherent in
most cooperative arrangements,3 the National Labor Relations Board
(the NLRB) and the courts often are poorly equipped to address the
controversial issues presented by these new structures. The language of
the Act is purposefully broad and provides little guidance in certain
complicated situations. 4 Attempts to look beyond the statutory lan-
guage to the intent of the drafters may prove equally frustrating. More-
over, the 1947 Taft-Hartley Amendments to the NLRA reflect
circumstances different from those existing when Congress passed the
original Act in 1935,' and many of the concerns that prompted both
1. See Gray, Commentary: Labor Management Cooperation, ARB. J., June 1983, at 17;
Jacoby, Union-Management Cooperation in the United States: Lessons from the 1920's, 37 INDus.
& LAB. REL. REV. 18 (1983).
2. Gray, supra note 1, at 17; see Jacoby, supra note 1, at 27; Schlossberg & Fetter, U.S.
Labor Law and the Future of Labor-Management Cooperation, 37 LAB. L.J. 595, 598-99 (1986)
(stating that the risks of tampering with traditional adversarial relationship are outweighed by the
need to pursue common goals).
3. See, e.g., Alexander, Worker Participation and the Law: Two Views and a Comment, 36
LAB. L.J. 428, 428 (1985); Address by James L. Lewandowski, Vice President, Human Resources,
Saturn Corp. The American Society of Personnel Administrators Mid-South Conference, Nash-
ville, Tenn., at 7, 8 (Oct. 29, 1987) [hereinafter Lewandowski Address]; Note, The Saturnization of
American Plants: Infringement or Expansion of Workers' Rights?, 72 MINN. L. REv. 173, 178-79
(1987). But see Gray, supra note 1, at 17 (stating that labor-management cooperation is "not sy-
nonymous with industrial peace").
4. See, e.g., supra Special Project Note, Future Cooperative Efforts, at notes 17-86 & 108-13
and accompanying text; supra Special Project Note, Hybrid Employees, at notes 10-17 & 77-79
and accompanying text; supra Special Project Note, Mandatory and Permissive Subjects, at notes
24-37 and accompanying text.
5. See Mills, Reforming the U.S. System of Collective Bargaining, MONTHLY LAB. REv., Mar.
1983, at 18-19; Schlossberg & Fetter, supra note 2, at 599-600; see also supra Special Project Note,
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pieces of legislation may no longer be relevant for current analysis.'
Judicial application of the NLRA creates additional confusion. In
adapting the provisions of the statute to situations not expressly con-
templated by the Act's drafters, the NLRB and the courts have devel-
oped a variety of tests and doctrines.7 Although helpful in certain
circumstances, these doctrines may prove particularly inadequate and
troublesome in the more complex factual settings presented by the new
cooperative arrangements." In addition, the availability of these tests
and doctrines may encourage a "pigeonhole" analysis, under which the
NLRB or a court forces the facts of a case into a particular category in
order to apply the appropriate formula and achieve a predetermined
result. This sort of analysis precludes any real assessment of the various
interests at stake, and even, perhaps, a careful reading of the statutory
language itself."
A prime example of the difficulties inherent in applying current la-
bor law to new types of cooperative efforts is the present controversy
over the Saturn project. Hailed as "an extraordinary commitment to
cooperative ways of dealing,"10 the Saturn project, as previously dis-
cussed, is essentially a partnership between General Motors and the
United Auto Workers (UAW) that contemplates union involvement in
virtually every aspect of management decisionmaking. 11 General Mo-
tors' Vice-President of Human Resources states that the innovative,
democratic management techniques of the Saturn arrangement will be
the critical factor in helping to restore General Motors to a more com-
petitive position in the world automobile market. 2 To implement these
principles, General Motors and the UAW entered into a "Memorandum
Hybrid Employees, at notes 5-9 and accompanying text.
6. See Gould, Fifty Years Under the National Labor Relations Act: A Retrospective View,
37 LAB. L.J. 235, 237 (stating that the "acrimony and conflict" of the 1930s was inconsistent with
"new realities" of labor-management relations). See generally supra Special Project Note, Future
Cooperative Efforts.
7. See supra Special Project Note, Future Cooperative Efforts, at notes 114-53 and accom-
panying text (discussing criteria used to determine presence of unlawful employer domination);
supra Special Project Note, Mandatory and Permissive Subjects, at notes 38-83 and accompany-
ing text (describing the development of the mandatory-permissive distinction and balancing test);
supra Special Project Note, Hybrid Employees, at notes 18-48 and accompanying text (addressing
the implied exclusion of "managerial" and "confidential" employees from coverage of the Act); see
also infra notes 17-31 and accompanying text.
8. See, e.g., supra Special Project Note, Mandatory and Permissive Subjects, at notes 84-
116 and accompanying text; infra notes 10-30 and accompanying text (discussing the Saturn
controversy).
9. The current controversy over the Saturn project illustrates the inadequacies of this pig-
eonhole analysis. See infra notes 10-30 and accompanying text.
10. Schlossberg & Fetter, supra note 2, at 602.
11. Id.; see Lewandowski Address, supra note 3, at 7-11.
12. Lewandowski Address, supra note 3, at 10-12.
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of Agreement," which recognizes the UAW as the bargaining represen-
tative for Saturn's future employees.' 3 Subsequently, the National
Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation filed unfair labor practice
charges with the NLRB."' The Division of Advice of the NLRB con-
cluded that no complaint should issue, reasoning that the Saturn Agree-
ment was the result of General Motors' duty to bargain with the union
over the potential adverse effects of a management decision on its
employees.'
5
Under current law both the Foundation and the Division of Advice
have supportable positions. The Foundation relied on a line of cases
prohibiting employers from recognizing a labor organization until the
organization had the support of a majority of the employees in the bar-
gaining unit.'" By using this analysis, the Foundation treated the Sat-
urn arrangement as the startup of a new facility under a new collective
bargaining agreement. 7 According to the Foundation, the possibility of
new employees meant they should be free to choose their own union or
whether to have union representation at all.' 8
13. Memorandum of Agreement Between Saturn Corporation and the United Auto Workers,
June 28, 1985, reprinted in Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 107, at E-1 (June 4, 1986) (LEXIS, Labor
library, DLABRT file) [hereinafter Saturn Agreement]; see supra Special Project, Introduction, at
note 9 and accompanying text.
14. See supra Special Project, Introduction, at note 11 and accompanying text.
15. Advice Memorandum Issued by the NLRB on UAW-GM Saturn Agreement, June 2,
1986, 1985-86 NLRB Dec. (CCH) 20,270, at 33,433 [hereinafter Advice Memorandum]; see supra
Special Project Note, Mandatory and Permissive Subjects, at note 75. For a discussion of the
Division's reasoning, see supra Special Project, Introduction, at notes 12-13 and accompanying
text.
16. One of the more important cases in this line was International Ladies' Garment Workers'
Union, AFL-CIO, v. NLRB (Bernhard-Altmann), 366 U.S. 731 (1961). In Bernhard- Altmann the
Supreme Court held that an employer's recognition of a union as the exclusive bargaining agent of
its employees at a time when the union did not have the support of a majority of those employees
constituted a violation of §§ 8(a)(1) and (2). The employer's good faith belief that the union had
the authorization of a majority of the employees did not affect the Court's analysis even though
the union eventually achieved majority status at the facility. In fact, the Court noted, "such acqui-
sition of majority status itself might indicate that the recognition secured by the [earlier] agree-
ment afforded petitioner a deceptive cloak of authority with which to persuasively elicit additional
employee support." Id. at 736.
The Foundation also relied on Kroger Co., 275 N.L.R.B. No. 202, 1985-86 NLRB Dec. (CCH)
V 17,425 (1985). In that case, the Board developed a two-part test to determine whether recogni-
tion of a union was premature. Under this test, recognition would not be premature if at the time
of recognition (1) the employee positions at the particular operation are substantially filled, and
(2) the operation has begun normal production. Id. at 29,970; see Letter from Rossie D. Alston,
Attorney for the National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation, to Rosemary Collyer, General
Counsel, Division of Advice of the NLRB, at 25 (July 16, 1986) [hereinafter Alston Letter] (copy
on file with the Vanderbilt Law Review).
17. See Alston Letter, supra note 16, at 13 (describing the Saturn project as an "entirely new
and separate enterprise which advocates a new approach to automobile manufacturing" because no
pre-existing contract between General Motors and the UAW was in place regarding the venture).
18. Id. at 9-11, 23.
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In contrast, the Division of Advice focused on the continuity of the
General Motors-UAW relationship than on the new aspects of the pro-
ject itself.19 From the former perspective, the Division relied on case
authority describing the duties of an employer who transfers work from
one facility to another.20 Under such circumstances, an employer actu-
ally might be required to recognize the union at the second facility.21
Thus, at least at one level, each side's argument depends on its
characterization of the facts of the Saturn arrangement, which, in turn,
dictates the application of doctrines from particular cases to produce
two diametrically opposed results. The problem is that the Saturn
Agreement, like many cooperative efforts, does not fit neatly into any
single fact pattern addressed by the current caselaw. By combining as-
pects of various factual models, the Saturn arrangement illustrates the
potential overlap of and inevitable conflict between several existing la-
bor law principles. More importantly, future court and NLRB decisions
eventually must confront the Foundation's basic question: "[W]hen
does effects bargaining end and unlawful support begin?
'2 2
The Division of Advice's response to the Saturn Agreement is dis-
appointing because of its failure to confront these important questions.
The Division acknowledged that a very different issue would have
arisen had General Motors and the UAW entered into a "functional
collective bargaining agreement, ' 23 but did not fully address the Foun-
dation's contention that the Saturn Agreement was indeed a functional
19. See Advice Memorandum, supra note 15, at 33,482 (assuming a "long and productive
collective bargaining relationship" and the corresponding duty to bargain).
20. When a transfer of operations involves the transfer of existing employees as well, the
NLRB has developed standards to determine whether the collective bargaining arrangements at
the old facility should be applicable at the new facility. Generally, if the operations are "substan-
tially the same" at the two facilities, and if transferee employees constitute a "substantial percent-
age" of the work force at the new facility, then the old collective bargaining agreement will be
enforced at the new facility. Harte & Co., 278 N.L.R.B. No. 128, 1985-86 NLRB Dec. (CCH)
1 17,749, at 30,343-30,344 (1986). See Note, The GM-UAW Saturn Agreement: A New Approach
to Premature Recognition, 74 VA. L. REv. 89, 102 (1988).
21. The Harte decision noted that the focus on continuity of operations reflected standards
under the "contract bar" rule, whereby a union that is a party to an existing collective bargaining
agreement is presumed to have the support of a majority of the employees during the term of the
agreement. Note, supra note 20, at 102. This presumption is rebuttable only after twelve months
and upon a showing that the union in fact no longer represents a majority of the employees. Id. A
transfer demonstrating sufficient continuity with the previous operations is not sufficient to rebut
this presumption. Harte, 278 N.L.R.B. No. 128, 1985-86 NLRB Dec. (CCH) 17,749, at 30,343-
30,344 (1986).
For a more complete discussion of relocations and other premature recognition issues, see
Note, supra n.20.
22. Alston Letter, supra note 16, at 5 n.3. See supra Special Project, Introduction, at note 13
and accompanying text.
23. Advice Memorandum, supra note 15, at 33,485-33,486.
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collective bargaining agreement.2" The Division likewise disposed of the
premature recognition claim by stating that General Motors was not
actually recognizing the UAW at present,2 5 despite the clear language of
the Agreement.2" Instead, the Division viewed the Agreement as a com-
mitment to recognize the UAW in the future, if and when the UAW
received majority support, despite the lack of such conditional wording
in the Agreement itself.27 While the effects bargaining rationale pro-
vides strong support for the decision,2 the Division's failure to confront
these crucial inconsistencies detracts from its analysis. The Division's
decision supports cooperation in the instant case, but may do a disser-
vice to future cooperative efforts by failing to provide a realistic ap-
praisal of the potential legal obstacles involved.
The Saturn arrangement also illustrates a more fundamental prob-
lem of the need for a frank reassessment of the various interests at
stake in modern industrial relations and the extent to which those in-
24. The Division of Advice stated only that "the current evidence is insufficient to establish
that GM and the UAW. . . have entered into a functioning collective bargaining agreement before
any employees have begun working at Spring Hill." Advice Memorandum, supra note 15, at
33,485. The fact that the Agreement contains specific provisions concerning wages, hours, promo-
tion policy, and other matters, see Saturn Agreement, supra note 13, indicates that the issue may
not be so simple, and may require additional discussion. The Foundation contends that "Saturn
Corporation and the UAW would be surprised to find that they did not have a functioning collec-
tive bargaining agreement" and quotes the following statement of General Motors' counsel:
Interestingly, no one called this process collective bargaining and yet what was happening was
collective bargaining in a very genuine, indeed in a most sophisticated sense. . . . It was col-
lective bargaining based not on an obsolete ideological, adversarial mindset, but rather
... [that] which results in employees, through the instrumentality of their union becoming
participants in the enterprise rather than simply contributing their labor to the production
process.
Alston Letter, supra note 16, at 26, 27 & n.17 (quoting Address by E. Hartwig, Associate General
Counsel, General Motors Corp., The Collective Bargaining Process, at the Conference on the Labor
Board at Mid-Century, Washington, D.C. (Oct. 4, 1985)). The Foundation also noted that "dealing
with" a labor organization is sufficient to create a collective bargaining relationship under the stan-
dard established in NLRB v. Cabot Carbon, 360 U.S. 203 (1959). In its view, the Saturn Corpora-
tion was clearly "dealing with" the UAW and thus could not argue that there was no collective
bargaining relationship. Alston Letter, supra note 16, at 27-29; see also Hall, UAW-GM Saturn
Contract: "Sweetheart Deal" or Novel Labor-Management Agreement?, 17 MEM. ST. U.L. REv. 69,
80-82 (1986). For a more detailed discussion of Cabot Carbon, see supra Special Project Note,
Future Cooperative Efforts, at notes 107-13 and accompanying text.
25. "[T]he investigation of the instant charges does not support the allegation that GM is
now recognizing UAW." Advice Memorandum, supra note 15, at 33,486 n. 12.
26. See supra Special Project, Introduction, note 7; see also Hall, supra note 24, at 82.
27. Advice Memorandum, supra note 15, at 33,485. The NLRB had implied a similar condi-
tion into a recognition agreement in Kroger Co., 219 N.L.R.B. 388 (1978), on the assumption that
"the parties intended their agreement to be lawful." Advice Memorandum, supra note 15, at
33,485.
28. Having characterized the Saturn facts as the transfer of current General Motors employ-
ees from one facility to another, the Division of Advice argued quite convincingly that nothing
prohibits General Motors from "preferring its own employees over 'the rest of the world.'" Advice
Memorandum, supra note 15, at 33,484.
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terests are protected both under the existing legal framework and in a
cooperative setting.2 9 The history of the NLRA reflects a two-party,
union-verses-management orientation. The Act, passed during the De-
pression, sought to increase the power of employees in relation to their
employers by encouraging the growth of independent unions and elimi-
nating the evils of company-dominated unions.3 0 The concept of em-
ployee freedom of choice in this context is the equivalent of the
employees' right to be free from coercion by the employer.3 1
By 1947 independent unions were in a much stronger position to
bargain with management. Consequently, many of the Act's statutory
protections were no longer as critical as when the Act was drafted. The
Taft-Hartley amendments place greater emphasis on employee freedom
of choice than on encouraging the growth of unions.32 These amend-
ments specifically protect an employee's right not to join a union.38
While clearly acknowledging the individual employee's right to opt out
of the two-party bargaining system, the Act maintained a basic two-
party emphasis, with the corresponding assumption that an adversarial
relationship provides the best protection for both sides.34
The "hybrid" employee who was neither truly "labor" nor truly
"management" represents another interest outside the traditional ad-
versarial relationship.3 5 Except for the Act's express exclusion of super-
visors, the NLRA provides little guidance on the treatment of hybrid
employees. Faced with this lack of clear guidance, courts sought to ana-
lyze the employee's particular function to determine which of the two
positions his interests more closely resembled. These third parties sim-
ply were placed in one of the existing adversarial categories despite po-
tentially distinct interests.
If collective bargaining by two adversarial parties were the exclu-
29. Several observers have noted that most of the recent emphasis on cooperation focuses
solely on union-management cooperation, rather than on more general employee-management rela-
tions. See, e.g., Comments by Donald R. Sazama, President, Pioneer Steel Corp., Detroit, Mich.,
reprinted in U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AND COOPERATIVE
PROGRAMS, U.S. Labor Law and the Future of Labor-Management Cooperation 11 (First Interim
Report Feb. 1987) [hereinafter DEP'T OF LABOR REPORT]; J. Bruce Johnston, Executive Vice-Presi-
dent, USX Corporation, Pittsburgh, Pa., reprinted in DEP'T OF LABOR REPORT, supra, at 15; David
Y. Denbolm, President, Public Service Research Council, Vienna, Va., reprinted in DEP'T OF LABOR
REPORT, supra, at 21; and Professor Herbert R. Northrup, The Wharton School, University of
Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pa., reprinted in DEP'T OF LABOR REPORT, supra, at 23.
30. See supra Special Project Note, Future Cooperative Efforts, at notes 21-86 and accompa-
nying text.
31. See id. at notes 83-86 and accompanying text.
32. See Schlossberg & Fetter, supra note 2, at 599; see also supra Special Project Note,
Hybrid Employees, at notes 8-10 and accompanying text.
33. See supra Special Project, Introduction, note 11 (text of § 7 of the NLRA).
34. See Schlossberg & Fetter, supra note 2, at 599-600.
35. See supra Special Project Note, Hybrid Employees.
[Vol. 41:659
LABOR-MANAGEMENT
sive model of labor-management relations, the lack of separate atten-
tion to potential third party interests raises, at the very least, potential
problems concerning individual rights. With the trend toward an alter-
native, cooperative model, however, the role of these additional inter-
ests takes on new importance. In undermining the adversarial
assumption, cooperative efforts can be more receptive to the presence of
interests distinct from the union-management dichotomy.3 6 Parties not
traditionally aligned with one side or the other might serve also as a
buffer to facilitate transition to a more cooperative setting.
This potentially greater role for nonadversarial interests can alter
the balance of power between unions and management and thereby de-
prive the union of some of its bargaining strength. Most unions have
opposed cooperative arrangements3 7 because unions have the most to
lose in the current move toward cooperation. Employers, while gener-
ally reluctant to relinquish any of their managerial discretion, recognize
the benefits of cooperation to the company as a whole in terms of in-
creased employee morale and productivity. Individual employees enjoy
added benefits from cooperation in terms of an increased sense of par-
ticipation and the potential for greater job security. Furthermore, non-
unionized employees and other employees outside the coverage of the
NLRA finally may gain the influence denied them under a strict two-
party adversarial system.
To the extent that a union has an interest distinct from that of the
employees it represents, this interest is the most dramatically affected
by the trend toward cooperative systems. Unions exist for the very pur-
pose of collective bargaining; therefore, attempts to supplement or re-
place the adversarial structure inevitably raise questions about the
viability of the adversarial representative as well. Unions traditionally
have argued that an adversarial system is the only way to guarantee
protection of employee interests, but such a view may discount the em-
ployees' ability to protect themselves through mechanisms other than
unions. Cooperative efforts clearly threaten certain established rela-
tions. The question is whether the alternative relations proposed by co-
operation can better protect the broader range of interests concerned.
Despite union fears about the coopting effects of some cooperative
ventures, unions can derive significant benefits from cooperative ar-
rangements. In the Saturn project, for example, the UAW retained con-
36. See Comment of Robert M. Nielsen, Assistant to the President, American Federation of
Teachers, reprinted in DEP'T OF LABOR REPORT, supra note 29, at 4.
37. See, e.g., Comment of the Hon. Orrin G. Hatch, Chairman, U.S. Senate Labor and
Human Resources Committee, Washington, D.C., reprinted in DEPT OF LABOR REPORT, supra note




siderable protection for its members, while gaining additional influence
in the managerial decisionmaking process. The real problem with the
Saturn Agreement was its failure to provide adequately for potential
third party interests-specifically, the unknown percentage of potential
non-UAW employees.
The NLRA and its judicial interpretations have attempted over the
years to address a variety of underlying concerns of American industry.
The most fundamental balancing of interests pits the goals of industrial
stability and profitability against the need to protect individual work-
ers' rights. The collective bargaining process and its adversarial ethic
address a perceived need for more effective representation of employee
rights, but the collective process itself may hinder the protection of
more individual concerns about free choice.
This tension between conflicting interests predates the passage of
the NLRA and reflects a more general American conflict between the
values of individualism and the majoritarian principle. Recent labor-
management cooperative efforts simply have brought this tension into
full view. The real issue posed by cooperative ventures is not so much
their legality, or even their desirability, but rather how to reconcile the
various interests involved. If cooperation is, as many observers believe,
critical to the future success of American industry, then the necessity








* The authors and editor would like to thank Professor Robert N. Covington and David P.
Lucey for their considerable and much appreciated efforts in preparing this Special Project.
666 [Vol. 41:659
